not sure i should forward this to you, but i am because i want you to see another perspective of the meeting with netscape so you can be fully informed. to be honest i worry that sometimes you get a distorted picture/account of things. for the guy at the top, that can be dangerous, as you need the best info possible so you can make the best decisions. i know you work hard to have good contacts at many levels in the org so you get good data, which is very wise. so here's more data...
nobody in the room was at Barkadale's level. He is very very impressive. I suspect he could have sent us home thinking Netscape buying MSFT was an appropriate deal.

IMO, the best we can do now is to avoid turning Netscape into novell. we will compete on just about every technology. they will do so with partnerships (sun/java, adobe/acrobat, etc). we will do so with our platforms. the two areas where we can cooperate and both win today are STT and DocObject. they have started their own ecommerce development. if we don't close a deal on just that piece within, say, 6 more weeks, it's dead.

with DocObject, we can lock them deeply into OLE for some time, while forcing them to ship a richer browser on windows than on the mac. otherwise has already done this to them, judging from the browser they shipped. each time they decide to ship something on windows (better yet, windows 95) and not on mac, we lessen their
cross-platform strengths.

maybe i am being a dick, but there is no deal here. if we are smart and left and engaged at the right levels, we have a chance to cooperate on a few of these smaller things, and can keep them from sabotaging our efforts thru the end of this year.

-thomas

ps: anderson and I both had thinkpad butterflys, he was running
win3.1 and got very excited about win95 on mine, loved internet
shortcuts and the infrared stuff. he is a gadget guy. I think he's
blinded by win95 for the time being.

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From: Dan Rosen
Sent: Thursday, June 22, 1995 4:23 PM
To: bill; nathani; paulma; peteh
Cc: abay; bena; boba; bohno; brandt; chrisja; jdoll; jimall; johnke; petea; pateh; nussa; twof; steve; thomaren; warrend
Subject: Netscape meeting

SUMMARY
Seven of us met with Jim Barkadale (CEO), Mike Homer (VP Marketing),
Mark Anderson (CTO), and Ram Shriram (VP Business Dev) of Netscape
for four hours yesterday. The purpose of the meeting was to scope
out specific areas that a relationship between the two companies
might take and to set in place a process to either conclude a
strategic relationship or go our separate ways.

Our goals going into the meeting were (in priority order):
1. Establish Microsoft ownership of the Internet client platform for
   Win95.
2. Have Netscape add value to the NT server and Back Office platform
   (above our stuff), making it the preferred Internet solution.
3. Have Netscape preferentially support Microsoft authoring
tools/solutions and support our viewers
4. Send a message to the marketplace that Netscape and Microsoft were
   cooperating on internet issues.

In general, it was a sounding out of each others' positions. They
were unwilling to share their three year business direction in any specifically (we weren't sure that they had one). They asked a lot of the right questions of us. I believe that we understand each other better.

ChrisJo summed up the purpose nicely: "We need to understand if you will adopt our platform and build on top of it or if you are going to compete with us on the platform level." All of the Netscape players were clear — they want to build on our platform as a first preference. They understand that we are going to incorporate into the platform (independent of any relationship with Netscape) technology that they provide today; they want to know what is in the platform and understand that we won't arbitrarily pull their most profitable stuff into the platform. Much of the conversation centered on a discussion of how the lines would be drawn between the platform and their value added. On the client end, we discussed "sucking most of the functionality of the current Netscape browser (but not the toolbar, cool places or advertising) into the platform; they seemed OK with this concept. On the server, JAllard asked about pulling most of the functionality of their commerce server into the platform, and again they indicated a willingness to follow our direction. Joint marketing programs were discussed as a potential "carrot". ChrisJo and JAllard took the action to get back to them with follow up on what is in the platform, and internal Microsoft proposals of terms and conditions required.

They shipped a beta of their Win95 client this week, and have announced their NT server product. They positioned this with us as "being closely tied to Microsoft direction". Members of the MS team have also interpreted this as Netscape's attempt to keep ahead of our efforts. We need to quickly outline the terms that would give us rapid indication of their intentions. Each of the team members will take the actions outlined in this memo and feed them back to me for a consolidated agreement with Netscape, hopefully within three weeks.

They also were concerned about MSN. They believed that MSN was a "closed" environment and that they couldn't add any value on MSN. ABay explained our openness and took the item to (a) look at the feasibility of the Netscape client being an MSN client; (b) look at the Netscape server being able to serve MSN customers on MSN; and (c) look at allowing the Netscape browser sign-up mechanism work with MSN for IP services.

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Netscape. They don't need the money and fear (a) a disruptive MS presence on their board; (b) the effect of dilution at a time when they are contemplating the timing of an IPO; and (c) the message a MS investment would send to others. He wanted to know if the above deals were conditional on equity; I said "loosely conditional". We will talk again in a couple of days as we consider the options.

CONCLUSIONS
The critical question is: Do they want to align strategically with us or not? Are they willing to bet that we will be successful, and will they make the commitment and changes necessary in their strategy to align with us?

The test of this alignment will be Netscape's agreement to use Microsoft's client code on Win 95, and use our BackOffice and NT APIs, and promote these as their preferred solutions. If we can achieve this alignment, we have a deal. One clear challenge will be definition of how they add value on top of our client platform in particular.

In the meeting, they seemed to embrace this strategy, both for Windows95 and NT. However, they also tried as much as possible to preserve their right to be open - in technology, cross-platform, and relationships with others. We did not have specific proposals to test their intentions. We must quickly generate specific proposals to assess their direction.

If we discover that they do not agree to do align with us, then we should simply treat them as an ISV. They are an ISV today, with a majority of the Internet browser business today. It was clear that there are ISV arrangements that benefit both companies, regardless of any larger deal. These include Netscape licensing STT, becoming Office compatible, adopting DocObject, supporting our formats, etc.

Whether we succeed in forming a strategic relationship with Netscape or not, it is essential that we commit resources to developing and delivering our Internet strategy. Netscape will have to follow if we set a strategy and execute quickly on it. This means staffing and supporting:

- Platforms - both client and server.
- Tools/Solutions - both bundling and developing code that leverages our platforms.
- Services - billing, IP access to MSN, etc.
- Marketing/Relationships/PR - a team who owns MS Internet message and understands what customers want in a Microsoft offer.
- Recruiting - targeted campaign to staff these positions with the most talented people

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**ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

Thanks to Anthony Bay, J Allard, Barb Fox, Chris Jones, Thomas Reardon, and Richard Wolf for their participation and good ideas. I suspect that I will not adequately represent their clear thinking here.
Per my previous message, the next step in engaging Netscape is to send them a list of things we would consider for an agreement or relationship and then get a team together from the two sides to discuss and put enough meat on the bones to reach an agreement. We need to move quickly, or risk them continuing at their torrid pace of deals that make working with them more difficult.

I propose that our team be those on the TO line. Can each person there commit to do this? Netscape has proposed that we come to Mt. View next Wednesday 5/21. Barkdallie (CEO), Homer (Marketing VP), Andressen (CTO) and others will attend.

Thanks to all for the comments on the previous draft of the list of items to discuss. I've incorporated the specific items. Two comments: (1) General strategy is to "love them to death". We will give them sufficient reason to align with us (primarily they should make enough money) that they will have sufficient incentive NOT to do things with our competitors. Most people saw this as preferable than getting them to agree not to work with our competitors. (2) We need to get to a sufficient level of detail as soon as possible in our discussions. This list is not meant to be a term sheet - just framing our discussion.

If everyone is OK with the attached discussion list and this process, I will send to Netscape Friday PM. (I'm on the East Coast until then and can be reached via email or pager (1800SKYPAGE, PIN 577-9037).

Dan

0613NETS.DOC
From: Dan Rosen(SMTP:rosen)
Sent: Friday, June 09, 1995 5:40 PM
To: johnlu; nathanm; paulma; peteh; ppather; russa
Cc: abay; billg; chrisj; peterm; stevesl
Subject: Netscape engagement

Per my last mail message, Netscape agreed to exchange lists for terms of engagement. Attached is a draft of my list. Special thanks to PPath and JohnLu for help.

Two key events:

1) Jim Barkdale originally requested a meeting tomorrow (Saturday) with us, him and Mike Horner and Mark Andressen. He later called to defer for a week. Tells me he is sincere and wants to be aggressive in seeking a relationship.

2) The IBM offer for Lotus should play into our hands, since he sees Lotus as his #1 competitor.

I'd appreciate any input to the attached list. I propose exchange for next Tuesday.

Dan

Attached Document: "netseng.doc"
Subject: RE: Netscape Meeting

White, I don't disagree with any of the specifics in the mail. I did not get the impression (from the meeting at least) that Netscape is "ready for a broad strategic relationship". It was clear that he/she viewed the client as a key place to make money, since that is "hook is so important for selling additional software". Barksdale was primarily interested for us to distribute his client and his server, but was willing to consider doing client extensions if it did not cut him off from doing other extensions, and fit into their view of the "market demands". Also given Barksdale's rather strange view of the market (first opportunity is intra-company, then inter-company, then consumer), I wonder if he speaks for all of Netscape.

We should proceed to exchange lists with them. But I suspect that it will be challenging to get them to concretely commit to do something concrete in a given timeframe.

Sent: Monday, June 05, 1995 1:18 AM
To: dan@nycom
Cc: sbay; billg; brandl; chrisb; jallard; jimalt; peter; ppathe

Attn: Don Ross

Attached is my summary of the meeting that Nathan, Paul and I had with Jim Barksdale of Netscape.

Day

<<File: 0802NETS.DOC>>
I will just add that this seemed to go very well.

I want to get them to sign up to the whole MSN front end (with Blackbird and Media view as subsets), the Office format viewers, and an extension mechanism which allows us to do Windows controls and OLE. I think that this is possible - at least from the spirit of the meeting on Friday.

Nathan
Attached is my summary of the meeting that Nathan, Paul and I had with Jim Barkudele of Netscape.

Dan

netscapesummary.doc
Bill Gates

From: smtp.paulma
Sent: Thursday, June 01, 1995 8:50 AM
To: billg; brianf; christo; nathanan
Subject: FYI: working with Netscape

FYI

From: [Email Address]
Sent: Thursday, June 01, 1995 1:51 AM
To: billg; brianf; christo; nathanan
Subject: working with Netscape

Dan&Bab:SI met late yesterday to review our recent discussions with Netscape and form our next few action items. Dan is meeting with Jim Barksdale, their CEO, shortly. Here’s a summary of our thinking, note that there is a lot of conjecture about MS plans that’s not called out as such. Apologies if this is random, but I wanted to collect.

Working goals:
1. Launch STT, our electronic payment protocol. Get STT presence on the Internet.
3. Avoid cold or hot war with Netscape. Keep them from sabotaging our platform evolution.

1. Launch STT

Our first and currently most important goal is to launch STT. We feel that we have the client-side story well covered, but we are dead without a server-side (merchant channel) partner. Bab6i expect that STT will be ready for our first 0’Hare update in Aug/sep.

We want to close a deal with Netscape:
- give them source to our STT code
- Netscape implements on Netscape Web server, Unix and NT
- Netscape implements on Netscape Win16 & Mac clients
- Netscape shares some of the backend revenue with MSft. this is prospective revenue thrown at us by Visa and/or Mastercard
- Non-exclusive, either party could implement additional payment protocols

By partnering with Netscape on payment, even exclusively, we will force Visa and Mastercard and any other backend player to fall quickly into line, and establish the ‘per-click’ business. This seems to be the grail that we all lust for. My take from the recent W3C meeting is that nothing will solidify the rest of the payment community more than Msft’s entry; this community is also looking for leadership from Netscape; if Msft enters with Netscape much of the likely opposition would be stymied. Bab points out that Mastercard and Visa expect to play Msft and Netscape off against each other.

2. Move Netscape out of Win32/Win95, avoid battling them in the next year.

In every meeting we have with Netscape, they emphasize that they realize there is no money in the client business, though mindshare there leads to many other opportunities. The businesses they see opening up are the server integration business, and the value-added app business (such as RealAudio, Java applets, secure newsgroups, etc). They are clearly focusing on the server business already, much more so than Msft.

They appear to be moving fast to establish themselves in the value-added app business by leveraging Netscape itself as a platform. They are the only browser today with a published OLE automation interface. Most pages are currently authored to Netscape capabilities. Add those two factors (expansion capability plus ‘proprietary’ leading edge visual) and you have a platform and installed base to begin from.

Dan points out that we must offer them some story as to how they can slowly shift away from the core client business, or at least the core Win32 client business. To my mind this means agreeing on client interfaces and wire protocols so they can build these value-added apps and enhanced servers.
BredSi pointed out yesterday that since we are in a come-from-behind position wrt Netscape, we must have a cross-platform story. This story could be told two ways though, one in which Maft actually builds all of the clients (Win32, Win95/Win98, Win16, Mac, maybe Unix), or another scenario where Netscape does that client work in cooperation with Microsoft. In the latter scenario, Maft would need to share extensions (eg, mediaview within share) with Netscape so they could port to Mac. BTW, if we are serious about moving mediaview into share, then we need to resolve our Mac story also.

One note about Unix: since most web pages are designed on Unix boxes, and probably all good looking pages are, having a Unix "client" available is critical for gaining acceptance of any one "interpretation" of web protocols. This will be the case until a suite similar to SIGI's WebForce is available on PC's.

Near term, that is the next 6 months, we need to find a structured way to work with Netscape to avoid protocol collisions. Already, our new <font> markup causes Netscape pain. As we move to electronic updates, this problem will get worse. They have enough of an installed base already that this problem will not go away when O'Hare ships, even with our wildest projections for O'Hare adoption.

Dan feels there is reasonable hope for engaging Netscape in long term strategic cooperation, where Netscape might run with the Mac and Win16 clients. As a first pass, we can probably at least get them to move STT client to the Mac and not worry about that problem til we're ready with our own cross-platform tools next year???

What's next?

In the worse case scenario, Netscape will move from minor public dinging of O'Hare (Barksdale in PC-Week two weeks ago) to open slandering of all of our Internet tools, as well as explicit sabotaging of any protocol extensions we make. It's unlikely they will deliver a superior Windows solution to O'Hare, but they will leverage their cross-platform story to keep entrenching Netscape-HTML in the authoring community, and therefore in the viewing community.

As a yardstick, Netscape 1.1 took six months, and adds some nice stuff, but in just five months we've been able to achieve parity to Netscape 1.0 and nearly all of Netscape 1.1 (everything but SSL and tables); we are moving faster on our own platform.

There are varying degrees of what I'd call successful scenarios, from merely getting Netscape signed up for STT in their servers, to outright joint-design of multi-platform clients going forward.

The question then is do we try to accomplish a broad client cooperation agreement, within STT negotiations, or independently. We felt that since payment protocols was such a hot issue, that STT needed to be closed on its own, and that all of you obviously need to consider the bigger issues without holding up any STT deal. Is this sensible?

Barb&Dan, please correct any silly assertions I've made.